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Abstract— The non-repudiation as an essential requirement of 
many applications can be provided by the asymmetric key model. 
With the evolution of new applications such as mobile commerce, 
it is essential to provide secure and efficient solutions for the 
mobile environments. The traditional public key cryptography 
involves huge computational costs and is not so suitable for the 
resource-constrained platforms. The elliptic curve-based 
approaches as the newer solutions require certain considerations 
that are not taken into account in the traditional public key 
infrastructures. The main contribution of this paper is to 
introduce a Lightweight Public Key Infrastructure (LPKI) for 
the constrained platforms such as mobile phones. It takes 
advantages of elliptic curve cryptography and signcryption to 
decrease the computational costs and communication overheads, 
and adapting to the constraints. All the computational costs of 
required validations can be eliminated from end-entities by 
introduction of a validation authority to the introduced 
infrastructure and delegating validations to such a component. 
LPKI is so suitable for mobile environments and for applications 
such as mobile commerce where the security is the great concern. 
Keywords- Public Key Cryptography, Signcryption, Elliptic 
Curves, Mobile Security, Validation Authority. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, the Public Key Cryptography (PKC) is an essential 
security mechanism for any open and popular system. The 
conventional public key algorithms are usually slow and 
involve huge computational costs so they are not so suitable for 
the mobile environments and resource-constrained devices that 
are dealing with memory, power, and computational 
restrictions. With the evolution of new applications such as 
mobile commerce, deploying PKC by the mobile devices is 
unavoidable. The non-repudiation that is an essential security 
service for any application with the monetary value can be 
provided by the PKC. 
Although the processing capabilities of mobile phones are 
increasingly enhanced, and the newer mobile phones perform 
live video stream processing, designing secure and efficient 
enough cryptographic techniques is still an important issue 
since it can reduce the power consumptions and processing 
time. It is also an essential task especially when the 
cryptographic computations should take place in smart cards. 
While the PKC is generally used for security establishment at 
the application layer, it can be a suitable solution for the lower 
layers if the computational costs are lightened. 
The Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is usually deemed 
as a suitable solution for the resource-constrained devices [1]. 
However, the conventional Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) 
such as PKIX and Wireless Public Key Infrastructure (WPKI) 
are usually based on modular exponentiation (RSA) that is not 
so suitable for the resource-restricted platforms. This has 
stimulated many efforts to use ECC in PKIs [2, 3]. In EC-based 
systems, the public keys are obtained using the ECC, the 
signatures are usually EC-based, and certain considerations 
should be taken into account that are not the case in the 
traditional PKIs.  
In this paper, a Lightweight Public Key Infrastructure for 
the mobile environments, called LPKI, is briefly introduced 
that has considerably light computational costs since it is based 
on ECC and uses signcryption. LPKI introduces several 
improvements to the conventional PKIX to efficiently decrease 
its computational costs and make it suitable for the resource-
constrained platforms. This paper is organized as follows. 
Some preliminaries on ECC and signcryption are provided in 
Sections 2 and 3 respectively. The proposed infrastructure 
(LPKI) and its components are briefly introduced in Section 4, 
and Section 5 gives the conclusions. 
II. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Currently, the ECC has revolutionized the arena of security 
establishment. The EC-based solutions are usually based on 
difficulty of solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm 
Problem (ECDLP) and factorization in elliptic curves [4]. The 
EC-based systems can attain to a desired security level with 
significantly smaller keys than that of required by their 
exponentiation-based counterparts. As an example, it is 
believed that a 160-bit key in an elliptic curve-based system 
provides the same level of security as that of a 1024-bit key in 
an RSA-based system [4]. This creates great efficiencies in key 
storage, certificate size, memory usage, and required 
processing so it enhances the speed and leads to efficient use of 
power, bandwidth, and storage that are the basic limitations of 
resource-constrained devices. 
The EC-based approaches have a great computational 
advantage over their modular exponentiation-based 
counterparts when they are executed on constrained platforms 
[1]. Table I illustrates such an advantage for the running-time 
of ECDSA and RSA digital signatures over two mobile phones. 
†  Copyright © 2008 IEEE. Reprinted from the Proceedings of the 11th
IEEE International Conference on Communication Systems (IEEE
ICCS'08), pp.162-166, Nov. 2008 [DOI 10.1109/ICCS.2008.4737164]. 
This material is posted here with permission of the IEEE.  Internal or 
personal use of this material is permitted.  However, permission to
reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or 
for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution must be
obtained from the IEEE by writing to pubs-permissions@ieee.org. 
 
‡  Corresponding Author, ResearcherID: A-9528-2009 
TABLE I.  A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE EXECUTION TIMES (IN MS) [5] 
Mobile Phone Signature generation Signature verification ECDSA RSA ECDSA RSA 
Nokia 6610 2.294 74.682 4.382 2.825 
Siemens S55 18.963 883.602 35.277 30.094 
 
III. SIGNCRYPTION 
The signcryption is a relatively new cryptographic technique 
that is supposed to fulfill the functionalities of digital signature 
and encryption in a single logical step, and can effectively 
decrease the computational costs and communication 
overheads in comparison with the traditional signature-then-
encryption schemes. In the traditional signature-then-
encryption schemes, a message is digitally signed then 
followed by an encryption that has two problems: Low 
efficiency and high cost of such summation, and the case that 
any arbitrary scheme cannot guarantee the security. The first 
signcryption scheme was introduced by Zheng in 1997 [6]. 
Zheng also proposed an EC-based signcryption scheme that 
saves 58% of computational and 40% of communication costs 
when compared with the traditional EC-based signature-then-
encryption schemes [7]. Several signcryption schemes are also 
proposed during the years, each of them offering different level 
of security services and computational costs. The concept of 
signcryption and unsigncryption is depicted in Fig. 1 and 2 
respectively. 
 
Figure 1.  Signcryption 
 
 
Figure 2.  Unsigncryption 
IV. THE PROPOSED INFRASTRUCTURE (LPKI) 
The PKI is a set of hardware, software, people, policies, and 
procedures needed to create, manage, store, distribute, and 
revoke digital certificates [8]. Since description of a PKI takes 
hundreds of pages and due to the space limitations, we do not 
describe the common points that can be easily found in the 
PKIX references. Due to the popularity of X.509 certificates 
and its well-tried infrastructure (PKIX), we define our 
proposed infrastructure (LPKI) to have as much as similarities 
to the PKIX. The main differences between our proposed 
solution and the popular infrastructures such as PKIX and 
WPKI are as follows: 
1) Using ECC. This is opposed to the traditional, well-tried, 
and currently available infrastructures that are based on the 
modular exponentiation (RSA). 
2) Using symmetric encryption in which the PKC is used for 
the session key establishment. This is opposed to many of 
currently available schemes that use asymmetric algorithms for 
encryption. 
3) Using signcryption whenever both of encryption and digital 
signature are simultaneously required. This is opposed to the 
traditional systems deploying signature-then-encryption 
schemes. 
4) Assigning only one pair of private-public keys to each 
subscriber. This is opposed to some infrastructures such as 
WPKI that devotes two pairs of private-public keys to each 
subscriber, one pair for encryption, and the other pair for digital 
signature.  
5) Introducing a new component called Validation Authority 
(VA) for performing the required validations for the end-
entities. 
6) Taking into account several considerations such as public 
key validation that are essential in EC-based systems and are 
not considered in the traditional PKIs. 
Such improvements can effectively decrease the 
computational costs and communication overheads. Since 
LPKI is based on the ECC, it takes into account several 
considerations that are not the case in the traditional 
exponentiation-based infrastructures. The remaining of this 
paper is devoted to the distinguished specifications of the LPKI 
whereby it differs from its counterparts. This includes its 
components, public/private key and certificate generation, 
certificate repository, and the preferred security mechanisms. A 
typical low-level specification on domain parameters and 
certain considerations on their selections can be found in [9]. 
The remained issues correspond with the PKIX specifications. 
A. Components 
LPKI consists of the following components: 
 Registration Authority (RA): Takes care of registering the 
subscriber's details and issuing a unique identifier for each 
subscriber. 
 Certification Authority (CA): Takes care of issuing and 
managing certificates. 
 Digital certificates: Strings of information that binds the 
unique identifier of each subscriber to his/her 
corresponding public key. 
 Certificate Repository (CR): Takes care of certificate 
repository.  
 OCSP Server: Takes care of responding to the inquiries 
about the certificates' revocation statuses. It may be deemed 
as a part of CA.  
 Validation Authority (VA): A Trusted Third Party (TTP) 
that accomplishes all the required validations for the end-
entities. 
 Key Generating Server (KGS): An optional component that 
takes care of generating public-private keys and may be 
deemed as a part of RA. It is not required if the security 
policies allows end-entities to generate their own public-
private keys and they have adequate capabilities to do this. 
 End-entities: Mobile Equipments (ME) such as mobile 
phones and PDA with the following duties: 
– Generating the subscriber's public-private key pair, 
Applying for the first-time certification issuance, 
Requesting for the key pair update and certificate-
renewal (optional), 
– Storing and allowing access to the subscriber’s public-
private key pair, 
– Retrieving a certificate and its revocation status, 
Performing the required  validations including 
certificate validation and static/ephemeral public key 
validations (optional), 
– Taking care of security mechanisms. 
 Timestamp Server: Produces unique and valid timing 
information for the LPKI's components. 
B. Public / Private Key Generation 
For each user U, the private key is a randomly selected integer 
]1,1[  nSK RU , and the public key is a point of elliptic curve 
that is generated as GSKPK UU  . Each subscriber is 
identified with a unique identifier ( UID ). For the case of 
mobile networks, the unique identifier can be the subscriber's 
international phone number, e.g. MSISDN in the GSM. LPKI 
supports two modes of public key generation: 
Mode 1: Generating the public-private keys in the KGS, as it 
is depicted in Fig. 3. 
Mode 2: Generating the public-private keys at the end-entities, 
as it is depicted in Fig. 4. 
 
In the first mode, the public-private keys are generated in 
the trusted KGS. The generated public keys are then certified 
by the CA and the appropriate information is directly and 
securely stored on the subscriber's smart card, e.g. the SIM, as 
it is depicted in Fig. 3. According to the security policies, the 
CA may store the private key and other relevant information in 
a secure module as the key backup center, in order to use it for 
the future key recoveries. 
 
Figure 3.  Public-Private Key generation in the KGS (mode 1) 
 
Figure 4.  Public-Private Key generation at end-entities (mode 2) 
In the second mode, the keys are generated at the end-
entities, and they are stored on their smart cards or other 
security modules. The CA will then certify the generated public 
keys after adequate proofs. The CA should verify that the end-
entities really possess the corresponding private keys of their 
claimed public keys. This may be accomplished by a zero-
knowledge technique. Since resource-constrained devices are 
not capable of generating very strong random numbers to be 
used as private keys, and due to the inherent vulnerabilities of 
wireless interface, the former approach has an obvious security 
advantage over the latter. However, the second mode provides 
more flexibility since the procedures of automatic key update, 
and certificate renewal can be easily accomplished.  
Several considerations should be taken into account when 
the public keys are to be generated at end-entities (mode 2). 
Traditionally, the public key validation is not considered in the 
PKIX standards (such as [10] and [11]), and the CA performs 
just a proof of possession by checking the user's signature over 
a message of a predetermined format. This can be misused for 
an invalid-curve attack [4] when deploying the ECC. In the 
EC-based systems, the CA not only should perform the proof 
of possession but should also perform the public key validation. 
Otherwise, the CA may certify an invalid public key that is a 
key of a small order resided on an invalid-curve. Antipa et al. 
[12] demonstrated how to get a certificate for an invalid public 
key when the CA uses the ECDSA for digital signature. To 
thwart the invalid-curve attack, the CA should perform the 
public key validation. The public key of user U, ),( yxPKU   
is valid if all the following conditions are simultaneously 
satisfied [12]: 
(a) OPKU   where O denotes the point of elliptic curve at 
infinity. 
(b)  x and y should have the proper format of qF elements. 
(c) UPK  should satisfy the defining equation of E. 
The end-entities should have access to an authentic copy of 
the CA's public key, in order to use it for verifying the CA's 
signatures. For the case of mobile systems that use the SIM, the 
private key can be encrypted using the subscriber's password or 
PIN (Personal Identification Number), and it can be stored in 
an elementary file of the SIM. The hash value of the private 
key that can be used for validation of the encrypting password 
can also be stored in the SIM. The public keys can be stored in 
a transparent elementary file. For the case of GSM and 
according to the GSM 11.11 standard, the trusted keys and 
certificates are stored in 4FXX files, and the key information 
can be stored in file 4F50. 
C. Digital Certificates 
Each subscriber should get a digital certificate UCert  for 
his/her public key from the CA. In the LPKI, each subscriber's 
identifier is associated with only one pair of public-private keys 
so the CA issues only one certificate for each subscriber. 
Unlike the WPKI that has reduced the required amount of 
certificate storage by omitting some fields from the X.509 
certificate's format, the LPKI uses the same format of the 
popular and well-tried X.509v3 certificates. However, all the 
signatures over the certificates should be EC-based with the 
same domain parameters of the LPKI. With the current 
evolution of technology, both smart cards (e.g. the SIM) and 
handheld devices have adequate storage capacity that they do 
not have any problem with the format of X.509 certificates, 
especially when each subscriber is associated with only one 
digital certificate in the LPKI. Since all the required validations 
will be delegated to the VA, the involved entities are not 
dealing with the individual certificates so their resource 
constraints will not cause any problem with the format of 
X.509 certificates. Since LPKI uses the same format of 
X.509v3 certificates, it has a compact compatibility with the 
LPKI, and its certificates can be used in any other compatible 
infrastructure and system. 
D. Certificate Repository 
For each subscriber, a set of information including the unique 
identifier, the public key, and the issued certificate are stored in 
the CR, as it is depicted in Fig. 3 and 4. The CR in the LPKI 
stores certificates in an LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access 
Protocol) directory [13]. The LDAP [14] that was initially 
developed for accessing, querying, and manipulating the 
X.500-based directory services on the Internet, supports 
TCP/IP, uses a hierarchical tree-like structure, and represents a 
lightweight, fast, and scalable directory service. The LDAP 
records must be updated at the appropriate times, and when a 
certificate is issued or revoked.  
E. Security Mechanisms 
The confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and non-
repudiation are the most desired security services for many 
systems that are provided with the security mechanisms such as 
encryption and digital signature. In the LPKI, all the messages 
are encrypted using a secure symmetric encryption algorithm 
such as AES where its secret key is established using the 
public-private keys of the involved entities. Although any 
authenticated key exchange protocol can be deployed, LPKI 
takes advantage of EC-based and improved version of the 
HMQV key exchange protocol [15]. This is because of its 
efficiency, standardization, and several number of provided 
security attributes. LPKI provides only one pair of public-
private keys for both encryption and digital signature. This can 
be accomplished using the signcryption schemes that need to 
only one pair of keys for simultaneously performing encryption 
and digital signature. Some signcryption schemes can be made 
generalized, i.e. it is possible to use them for the purpose of 
encryption, digital signature, or both of them. If the key backup 
and key recovery is not considered in the security policies, it 
may be necessary to choose a signcryption scheme that 
provides the attribute of public verifiability so the judge can 
easily verify the previously issued signatures of end-entities 
without any need for their private keys, even if the end-entities 
have lost their own private keys. 
F. Certificate Validation and Messages flows 
Any public key is not trustworthy unless it is verified using its 
corresponding validated certificate. The certificate validation 
mainly includes [16]: 
1. Verifying the integrity and authenticity of the certificate by 
verifying the CA's signature over it. 
2. Verifying that the certificate is not expired. 
3. Verifying that the certificate is not revoked. 
In order to perform the certificate validation, it is necessary 
to obtain the revocation status of the certificate. Generally, the 
revocation status can be obtained using either of Certificate 
Revocation List (CRL), Delta CRL, or Online Certificate Status 
Protocol (OCSP). Since OCSP [17] is the most profitable 
solution for the resource-constrained devices that are not 
capable of saving a too large CRL, and according to its great 
advantage due to its online and timely responses, LPKI has 
introduced the “OCSP Server” as one of its components. The 
OCSP responses are digitally signed with a private key that its 
corresponding trusted public key is known to the end-entities. 
Two modes of information retrieval and message exchange 
are predicted in the LPKI, as are depicted in Fig. 5 and 6 in 
which AOCSP  and BOCSP  denote the corresponding OCSP 
tokens for the certificates of Alice and Bob. In mode “1”, it is 
assumed that the end-entities are capable of performing the 
certificate validation, and static/ephemeral public key 
validations. In mode “2”, on the other hand, all validations 
including the certificate validation and ephemeral/static public 
key validations of both end-entities are delegated to the VA so 
it offers significant advantages for the resource-constrained 
platforms due to its decreased computational costs and 
communication overheads. This is because the required time of 
sending a certificate to a validation server and subsequently, 
receiving and authenticating the response can be considerably 
less than the required time of performing the necessary path 
discovery and validations on a resource-constrained device.  
In mode “1”, both of end-entities should individually 
perform the certificate and static/ephemeral public key 
validations. However, in mode “2”, all the signcrypted 
messages are directed to the VA through the communication 
link, and the VA accomplishes all the required validations for 
both of sender and recipient end-entities. The VA will contact 
the designated entity after a successful validation. If any error 
occurs, the VA will send an error message to the initiator and 
saves a copy in its log file. According to the security policies, 
all the transmitted messages may be separately saved by the 
VA in a storage media.  
The VA accomplishes the certificate validation via the 
Delegated Path Validation (DPV) protocol [18]. The VA 
queries CR for the certificates of both sender and recipient 
through their identifiers. It digitally signs its responses unless 
an error is occurred. A hash value of all the transmitted 
parameters in addition to the identifiers of both sender and 
recipient end-entities should be included in its signed 
responses. The VA obtains its required revocation statuses by 
getting OCSP responses from the OCSP server.  
If an end-entity needs to know the public key or revocation 
status of another end-entity, according to its desired mode of 
operation, it sends the identifier of the recipient end-entity in 
addition to either of tags “1” or “2” that indicates the requested 
set of information to the gateway. The gateway retrieves the 
requested information from CR and/or OCSP server, and 
responses the corresponding end-entity, as it is depicted in Fig. 
5 and 6. 
 
Figure 5.  A typical message flow in the LPKI (mode “1”: End-entities are 
capable of performing the required validations) 
 
 
Figure 6.  A typical message flow for the delegated configuration of LPKI 
(mode “2”: All validations are delegated to the VA) 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, a Lightweight Public Key Infrastructure (LPKI) is 
introduced that is so suitable for the resource-constrained 
platforms, and for applications such as mobile commerce. It is 
based on the elliptic curve cryptography, deploys signcryption, 
assigns only one pair of private-public keys to each subscriber, 
delegates all the validations to a TTP called Validation 
Authority (VA). It has a compact compatibility with the well-
tried PKIX infrastructure since its certificates have the same 
format of the popular X.509v3 certificates. However, this does 
not cause any problem since all the validations are delegated to 
the VA. 
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